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Abstract 
 
In this paper, an explanation for the diminishing marginal product of labor is demonstrated in a 
model that incorporates the concept of entropy from information theory. First, I introduce the 
concept of “division of work” and argue that the division of work (i.e., the allocation of tasks in 
the production process) and not the division of labor (i.e., worker specialization) is the source of 
the diminishing marginal product of labor. Division of work results in a fragmentation of the 
information that workers can access, and inefficiencies other than the commonly assumed 
factors of redundancy and congestion in labor inputs are generated by this fragmentation of 
information. The introduced inefficiency is modeled using the concept of entropy from 
information theory and the experience curve effect theory. The mechanism of the diminishing 
marginal product of labor is well explained by the model, and the model is similarly used to 
explore the diminishing marginal product of capital. 
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1  INTRODUCTION 
 
Traditionally, a diminishing marginal product of labor has been regarded as a law in economics 
(e.g., Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004), even in production functions at the macro level. This 
property has also predominantly been empirically supported. The cause of the diminishing 
marginal product of labor is usually attributed to an increase in the amount of redundancy and 
congestion as labor inputs increase. As a result, the marginal product diminishes. This reasoning 
has generally been regarded to be too natural to question, particularly for production in small 
factories, and almost no recent studies have explored the reasons underlying labor’s diminishing 
marginal product. The law of the diminishing marginal product of labor has been applied widely, 
including in production functions at the macro level.  
 There is a factor, however, that may eliminate redundancy and congestion in labor 
inputs at the macro level. If the division of labor is well managed in an economy, redundancy 
and congestion may disappear. With an appropriate arrangement of division of labor, therefore, 
the marginal product of labor may not diminish at the macro level. Adam Smith (1776) viewed 
the division of labor as the specialization of an individual worker’s or organization’s skills 
through education, training, and practice that increases productivity. Smith argued that increases 
in productivity are derived from (1) the dexterity of each worker, (2) time saved doing a more 
specialized task relative to switching among different activities, and (3) facilitation of 
production through the use of machines. These three features, however, are basically unrelated 
to redundancy and congestion. Features (1) and (3) are a function of a worker’s increased skill 
as a result of specialization, not of mitigated redundancy or congestion. Feature (2) is also 
unrelated because time spent moving to and from various activities becomes unnecessary as a 
result of a worker’s specialization regardless of the existence of redundancy and congestion. As 
a whole, Smith’s concept of the division of labor is basically indifferent to redundancy and 
congestion. Therefore, the division of labor will not eliminate redundancy and congestion. 
 However, there is another factor that may eliminate redundancy and congestion. It is 
superficially similar to the division of labor. In this paper, I call it the “division of work”. 
Division of work does not indicate the level of specialization of workers skills but rather the 
distribution of differentiated work tasks. I propose that it is not division of labor but division of 
work that influences redundancy and congestion. If the division of work is well arranged, 
redundancy and congestion at the macro level will be nearly eliminated.  
 If well-managed division of work can eliminate redundancy and congestion, why has 
the marginal product of labor been observed to diminish? The observed diminishing marginal 
product implies that there may be another inefficiency that even the division of work cannot 
eliminate. This inefficiency may be the true factor that causes the marginal product of labor to 
diminish. This paper first examines the nature of division of work in detail and then the 
relationship between it and the diminishing marginal product of labor. An important feature of 
the division of work is fragmentation of information among workers. Harashima (2009, 2011, 
2012) showed that fragmented information will result in a diminishing marginal product. In this 
paper, the mechanism shown in the models in Harashima (2009, 2011, 2012) is examined in 
more detail in the context of entropy as presented in information theory (e.g., Shannon, 1948; 
Theil, 1967, 1972) and the experience curve theory (e.g., Wright, 1936; Hirsch, 1952; Boston 
Consulting Group [BCG], 1972). The concept of the quantity of information as a modification 
of the concept of entropy is introduced in the model presented in this paper. The model shows 
that marginal product of labor is closely related to the quantity of information that a worker 
possesses, that the quantity of information is inversely proportionate to the number of workers, 
and that the quantity of information does not decrease at the same rate that the quantity of labor 
increases. The quantity of information is shown to be the key factor in the diminishing marginal 
product of labor. 
 The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the differences between divisions of 
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labor and work are examined and the importance of the fragmentation of information resulting 
from the division of work is shown. In Section 3, the effect of fragmentation of information is 
modeled based on the concept of entropy as presented in information theory, and the close 
relation between the quantity of information and the experience curve effect is shown. The 
reasons for the diminishing marginal product of labor are explained in Section 4 based on the 
mechanism developed in Section 3. In Section 5, the diminishing marginal product of capital is 
examined and concluding remarks are offered in Section 6. 
 
2  DIVISIONS OF LABOR AND WORK 
 
2.1  Differences between divisions of labor and work 
The concept of division of labor has a long history dating back to Smith (1776). On the other 
hand, the idea of division of work has attracted little attention (e.g., Rizavi and Sofer, 2009). 
Division of work may be confused with division of labor, and it may be viewed as merely 
expressing the division of labor concept in different words. They are, however, completely 
different concepts as described below. 
 
2.1.1  Division of labor 
Based on Smith (1776), the division of labor is defined here as “the specialization of a worker’s 
skills,” where this specialization will continue throughout the worker’s career. Each worker is 
assigned a specialized skill. Hence, division of labor has the three features discussed in the 
Introduction. These advantages will always prevail in an economy. As noted in the Introduction, 
they are basically indifferent to redundancy and congestion, which means that specialization is 
optimized depending on the levels of technology (A) and capital inputs (K) regardless of the 
quantity of labor inputs (L). As a result, division of labor will have the following features: 
 
N1-1: For each given set of A and K, there exists a best division of labor. 
N1-2: Division of labor is kept best in any given period in an economy by market arbitrage. 
 
N1-1 reflects Smith’s view of division of labor and indicates that the best division of labor does 
not depend on L. The degree of specialization is determined by A and K. For example, medical 
doctors are divided into many specialized fields at present, but formerly a medical doctor dealt 
with various diseases because existing medical knowledge and capital were relatively primitive 
as compared with the present. Even if the number of doctors increased in those earlier periods, 
the degree of specialization would not necessarily change because it was constrained by the 
existing level of medical knowledge and capital. 
 
2.1.2  Division of work 
Division of work is defined here as “the assignment of differentiated tasks to each worker”, 
where (1) workers who possess the same specialized skill may be assigned to different tasks, (2) 
tasks are divided for each new project or contract, and (3) a divided task seldom encompasses a 
worker's entire career. 
 Division of work does not imply a distribution of specialized skills but rather a 
distribution of differentiated tasks. Even if some workers have the same specialized skill, they 
may be assigned to different tasks, and conversely, a worker with a specialized skill may be 
assigned to a variety of tasks that are not necessarily related to that skill. In this paper, a unit of 
tasks is called “divided work”. Because division of work is the assignment of differentiated 
divided works, division of work has the following features: 
 
N2-1: For each given set of A, K, and L, there exists a best division of work. 
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N2-2: Division of work is kept best in any period in an economy by market arbitrage. 
 
N2-1 indicates that the best division of work depends on not only A and K but also on L. The 
key difference from N1-1 is the inclusion of L. This difference means that division of work is 
influenced by redundancy and congestion in labor inputs. If L changes, the division of work has 
to be adjusted to best allocate the division of work for the changed set of A, K, and L according 
to N2-2. For example, if L increases for a given set of A and K, divided work will be adjusted so 
as to completely eliminate redundancy and congestion. This change will be implemented by 
adjusting production processes and personnel allocations. 
 Given N1-1, N1-2, N2-1, and N2-2, divisions of labor and work move differently 
when L changes. If L changes while A and K are unchanged, the division of labor is unchanged 
but the division of work may change because by N1-1, the best division of labor is unchanged 
even if L changes, and by N1-2, division of labor does not change, but on the other hand, by 
N2-1, the best division of work may be different before and after L changes; thus, by N2-2, the 
division of work may change to make it optimal if L changes. If the best division of work is 
different when L is different for any given set of A and K, then if L changes while A and K are 
unchanged, the best division of work must also change. 
 
2.2.  The advantages and disadvantages of division of labor 
The advantages of division of labor have previously been discussed, but Smith (1776) also 
noted some disadvantages: division of labor can result in a mental stagnation in workers, and 
because workers are confined to a single repetitive task, they can become ignorant of the world. 
These disadvantages, however, are not studied in theoretical economics because Pareto 
efficiency is indifferent to them. Economic outcomes may be indirectly affected negatively by 
the disadvantages to some extent (e.g., workers’ abilities may deteriorate), but these negative 
aspects of the division of labor will not change with a change in L for the same reason the 
advantages will not. 
 
2.3  The advantages and disadvantages of division of work 
2.3.1  The advantage: counterbalance  
As N2-1 and N2-2 indicate, redundancy and congestion in labor inputs can be eliminated by 
division of work. Appropriate division of work maximizes the production for a given set of A, K, 
and L. N2-1 and N2-2 indicate that any negative effect of an increase in L can be 
counterbalanced by reorganizing the division of work. 
 
2.3.2  The disadvantage: fragmented information 
The well-established concept of the diminishing marginal product of labor suggests that division 
of work nevertheless cannot remove all inefficiencies with regard to labor inputs, most likely 
because there are inefficiencies other than redundancy and congestion. Another possible source 
of inefficiency is the fragmentation of information resulting from the division of work. Each 
worker experiences only a fraction of the entire production process, and these divided and 
isolated workers can access only a fraction of the information on the entire production process. 
It is difficult for a worker to know information held by workers at different production sites. 
This problem is not a result of division of labor because the specialization of skills does not 
necessarily imply that workers’ access to information is limited. Workers with specialized skills 
will usually be assigned to specific divided works, and thus the information they have access to 
may be incomplete, but this limited access is a result of division of work, not division of labor. 
 Because all of the labor inputs are correlated in production processes owing to the 
division of work (i.e., production cannot be complete if any part of the divided work is not 
completed), the problem of fragmented information is especially problematic when workers 
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engage in intellectual activities. Intellectual activities such as decision-making and innovation 
will be enhanced if the amount of relevant information available to the worker increases. This 
correlation among all of the labor inputs indicates that all pieces of information about the entire 
production process need to be completely known by each worker to enable completely correct 
decision-making. However, only a portion of the information is available to each worker. 
Workers will inevitably face unexpected problems because of fragmented and incomplete 
information. When an unexpected problem occurs, workers with fragmented or incomplete 
information will make different, usually worse, decisions than those with complete information. 
As a result, overall productivity decreases. 
 For example, a CEO of a large company may know the overall production plan but not 
the local and minor individual incidents that happen at each production site each day. In contrast, 
each worker at each production site may know little of the overall plan but a great deal about 
local and minor incidents that occur for each specific divided task that each worker engages in 
at each production site. To be most efficient, even if many unexpected incidents occur, all of the 
workers and the CEO need to know all about the entire process because all of the labor inputs 
are correlated owing to the division of work. Practically speaking, however, it is nearly 
impossible for each worker to access all of the experiences of every other worker. 
 Division of work cannot simultaneously solve inefficiencies caused by redundancy 
and congestion and those caused by fragmented and incomplete information. Although a greater 
level of division of work eliminates the former, it generates the latter. Work is actually divided 
greatly in most workplaces. This implies that inefficiency resulting from redundancy and 
congestion is much more serious than that caused by information fragmentation, so work is 
divided greatly despite the fact that information fragmentation harms productivity. 
 
2.3.3  Solving unexpected problems with fragmented information  
Because of fragmentation of information, ordinary workers inevitably will face many 
unexpected problems as discussed above, and the level of efficiency decreases. If ordinary 
workers are able to solve at least some of the unexpected problems, inefficiency will be 
mitigated. Usually, however, ordinary workers are implicitly assumed to do only what they are 
ordered to do and nothing else, but to solve an unexpected problem, they are required to do 
more. They need to grasp a situation, speculate on the detailed structure of the entire production 
process, prioritize actions, and create innovations. They have to engage in intellectual activities 
to discover unknown mechanisms or rules; that is, ordinary workers have to do more than just 
what they are ordered to do and are required to possess intelligence. Of course, ordinary 
workers are not robots who only follow orders. They are human beings who have intelligence 
and are thus fundamentally different from machines―only humans can fix unexpected 
problems by creating innovations, and they indeed can at least partly address unexpected 
problems even with incomplete information. Workers’ ability to fix unexpected problems (i.e., 
use their intelligence) appears indispensable in production processes because many minor but 
unforeseeable incidents actually do occur on a regular basis. 
 It is not possible for ordinary workers to completely mitigate inefficiencies because 
each worker can access only fragmented and incomplete information when creating innovations 
to fix unexpected problems. As the level of division of work increases, workers are less able to 
correctly estimate the full structure of the entire production process and correctly prioritize 
actions to solve unexpected problems. Therefore, the amount of mitigated inefficiency resulting 
from division of work will depend on the level of information fragmentation. 
 
3  THE QUANTITY OF INFORMATION AND 
EXPERIENCE 
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In this section, I examine how information is fragmented, how the degree of fragmentation can 
be indexed, and how this index is related to division of work. 
 
3.1  Entropy 
In information theory (e.g., Shannon, 1948; Theil, 1967, 1972), the information content of a 
random variable xi ( X ) is defined as  
 
  ipln  , 
 
where X = {x1, x2, x3,…., xn} and pi is the probability of occurrence of xi. The entropy of X is 
defined as  
 
   


n
i
ii ppXH
1
ln  .                          (1) 
 
 Entropy in information theory can be interpreted as indicating the value of information 
contained in a message and also as indicating the “quantity” of information. Therefore, this 
concept can be used to examine fragmented information, particularly for measuring the 
magnitude of fragmentation. Higher levels of fragmented information will be seen as smaller 
levels of entropy for each worker. 
 
3.2  The quantity of information and division of work 
Let a “sign” be a fragment of information. A worker will observe various signs that are related 
to a divided work. Suppose that a worker observes NL signs in a given divided work. Even if 
some signs are qualitatively identical, they are accounted for as different signs if they are 
observed at different times or different places. If work was not divided, all signs could be 
observed by a worker, but work is divided, so a worker can only observe a portion of the total 
number of signs. Information that the unobserved signs conveys therefore remains unknown to 
the worker. As the division of work increases, the number of signs a worker can observe out of 
the total number of signs decreases. That is, division of work constrains the quantity of 
information a worker can know. 
 Signs are categorized by types, and signs within each type are qualitatively identical. 
Suppose that m types can be perceived in a divided work (s1, s2, s3,…, sm). The probability of 
occurrence of a type per a sign in a period is assumed to be constant on average, and the 
occurrence probability of type si is pi. The probability that type si is perceived for the first time 
after a worker observes j signs is 
 
  11  jii pp  
 
Hence, the probability that type si is perceived at least once when a worker observes NL signs is 
 
        LL Ni
N
iiiiiii pppppppp 

11111
12
. 
 
 In this paper, by modifying the concept of entropy, the quantity of information is 
defined as follows. For the information content  ipln , the quantity of information for NL 
signs is  
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        


m
i
i
N
iL ppNΠ
L
1
ln11  . 
 
The weight pi in H(X) (equation [1]) is replaced with   L
N
ip 11 in  LNΠ . This means that 
the value of information (the information content  ipln ) is same for any NL, but the 
probability of obtaining this information increases as NL increases from pi to   L
N
ip 11 . If NL 
= 1,  LNΠ  is equal to entropy, but as NL increases,  LNΠ  gradually diverges from entropy. 
 LNΠ  indicates the quantity of information that a worker can possess by observing NL signs. 
Suppose that 1 > pi ≥ pi + 1 > 0 for any i. In particular, suppose for simplicity that 
τ
i ip
  
where τ > 1. Hence,  LNΠ  is redefined as  τ,NΠ L  such that  
 
             




m
i
ττNτ
m
i
i
N
iL iiippτ,NΠ
LL
11
ln11ln11  .        (2) 
 
Because 1 > pi > 0 for any i,  τ,NΠ L  is a finite number. 
 
3.3 Diminishing marginal increase in the quantity of 
information 
The quantity of information increases as NL increases (i.e., as the worker can observe more signs 
in the divided work), but the marginal increase in the quantity of information diminishes 
because 
 
     
  
  
L
τ
L
τ
L
τ
L
L
Nτ
dN
iNd
iNd
iNd
dN
id
L 

 



 1ln
1ln
1lnexp11
 
   τNτ ii L   1ln1  . 
 
Because   01   LNτi  and   01ln  τi , 
 
 
  
0
11

 
L
Nτ
dN
id
L
 ; 
 
thus, by Eq. (2), 
 
 
 
0
L
L
dN
τ,NdΠ
 . 
In addition, 
 
 
       2
2
2
1ln1
11 τNτ
L
Nτ
ii
dN
id L
L




 . 
 
Because   01   LNτi  and   01ln  τi , 
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  
0
11
2
2

 
L
Nτ
dN
id
L
 ; 
 
thus, by Eq. (2), 
 
  
 
0
2
2

L
L
dN
τ,NΠd
 . 
 
Therefore, the quantity of information a worker possesses increases at a slower rate relative to 
the worker’s increase in experiences (NL). 
 The features of 
 
0
L
L
dN
τ,NdΠ
 and 
 
0
2
2

L
L
dN
τ,NΠd
 indicate that, for many values of 
τ, ΠNL,τ can be approximated by exponential functions such that 
 
  βLL μNτ,NΠ                               (3) 
for NL < N , where μ, β, and N are positive constants and 0 < β < 1.  
 
3.4  The quantity of information and the experience curve 
The functional form of Eq. (3) is similar to that for the “experience curve effect” that has long 
been studied in economics and business administration. This similarity implies that the 
mechanism of the experience curve effect can be explained based on the concept of the quantity 
of information. 
 
3.4.1  The experience curve 
The experience curve effect states that the cost of doing a task will be reduced the more often 
the task is performed. Workers who perform repetitive tasks exhibit an improvement in 
performance as the task is repeated a number of times. The primary idea of the experience curve 
effect (the “learning curve effect” in earlier literature) dates back to Wright (1936), Hirsch 
(1952), Alchian (1963), and Rapping (1965). The importance of the learning curve effect was 
emphasized by the Boston Consulting Group (BCG) in the late 1960s and early 1970s (e.g., 
BCG, 1972). The experience (or learning) curve effect has been applied in many fields, 
including business management, strategy, and organizational studies (e.g., on airplanes, Wright, 
1936; Asher, 1956; Alchian, 1963; Womer and Patterson, 1983; in shipbuilding, Searle and 
Goody, 1945; on machine tools, Hirsch, 1952; in metal products, Dudley, 1972; in nuclear 
power plants, Joskow and Rozanski, 1979; Zimmerman, 1982; in chemical products, Lieberman, 
1984; Argote et al., 1990; in food services, Reis, 1991). More recently, it has also been applied 
to technology and policy analysis, particularly energy technologies (e.g., Yelle 1979; Dutton 
and Thomas, 1984; Hall and Howell, 1985; Lieberman, 1987; Argote and Epple, 1990; Criqui et 
al., 2000; McDonald and Schrattenholzer, 2001; van der Zwaan and Rablc, 2003, 2004; Miketa 
and Schrattenholzer, 2004; Papineau, 2006). An empirical problem of the experience curve 
effect is to distinguish dynamic learning effects from static economies of scale. After surveying 
empirical studies, Lieberman (1984) concluded that, in general, static scale economies are 
statistically significant but small in magnitude relative to learning-based economies (see also 
Preston and Keachie, 1964; Stobaugh and Townsend, 1975; Sultan, 1976; Hollander, 2003). 
 The experience curve effect is usually expressed by the following functional form: 
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)1(
1
α
N NCC
   ,                            (4) 
 
where C1 is the cost of the first unit of output of a task, CN is the cost of the nth unit of output, N 
is the cumulative amount of output and is interpreted as the experience of a worker engaging in 
the task, and α is a constant parameter ( 10  α ). 
N
N
C
C2  and 1 – α are often called the progress 
ratio and learning rate, respectively. This log-linear functional form is most commonly used 
because of its simplicity and good fit to empirical data. Empirical studies have shown that α is 
usually between 0.6 and 0.9. Studies by BCG in the 1970s showed that the experience curve 
effects for various industries ranged from cost reductions of 10–25% for every doubling of 
output (i.e., 85.058.0  α ) (e.g., BCG, 1972). Dutton and Thomas (1984) present the 
distribution of progress ratios obtained from a sample of 108 manufacturing firms. The ratios 
mostly range from 0.7 to 0.9 (i.e., 85.048.0  α ) and average 0.82 (i.e., 71.0α ). 
OECD/IEA (2000) argues that industry-level progress ratios have a similar distribution as the 
firm-level ones shown in Dutton and Thomas (1984; see also, e.g., Hirsch, 1956; Womer and 
Patterson, 1983; Womer, 1984; Ayres and Martinas, 1992; Williams and Terzian, 1993). 
 The magnitude of α (or equivalently the progress ratio or learning rate) may be 
affected by various factors (e.g., Hirsch, 1956; Adler and Clark, 1991; Pisano et al., 2001; 
Argote et al., 2003; Sorenson, 2003; Wiersma, 2007). Nevertheless, the average α is usually 
observed to be about 0.7 (i.e., a progress ratio of 0.8 and a learning rate of 0.3) as shown in 
BCG (1972), Dutton and Thomas (1984), and OECD/IEA (2000). It therefore seems reasonable 
to assume that α is 0.7 on average.  
 An important element that experience conveys is information. By accumulating 
experience by doing a task, a worker increases the amount of information known about the task 
and the information becomes more complete. In this sense, N, which indicates experience in Eq. 
(4), reflects the current amount of information a worker possesses about a task. Accumulated 
experiences will improve efficiency in implementing a task because the worker’s amount of 
information on the task increases. However, if other factors remain the same, the magnitude of 
improvement will diminish as N accumulates because the information on the task will approach 
saturation. 
 Because the essence of experience is that it conveys information, the experience curve 
effect can be extended to a wide variety of tasks. The tasks need not be limited to a worker’s 
repeated actions, that is, tasks whose experiences are divided by periods. For example, a human 
activity can be divided into many experiences, each of which is experienced by different 
workers. Each experience conveys a subset of information, and a part of the subset overlaps 
with subsets regarding other experiences. The experience curve effect will be applicable to this 
kind of task if N is interpreted as a subset all worker experiences, so a task in a period with 
experiences that are divided among workers is also applicable to the experience curve effect in 
the same way as a task performed by a worker whose experiences are divided by periods. By 
extension, this logic suggests that tasks applied to the experience curve effect should not be 
limited to ones with experiences divided only by periods or workers. As long as the task is a 
human intellectual activity and its experiences are divided by factors other than periods or 
workers, the task will also be applicable to the experience curve effect because it has the 
common nature that each divided experience conveys only a subset of all of the information that 
affects a worker’s intellectual activities. Nevertheless, the concept of the experience curve effect 
should not be expanded infinitely. It can only be applied to the tasks of workers, the 
performances of which differ depending on the amount of information the worker has. 
 
3.4.2  The quantity of information and the experience curve effect 
As shown in Section 3.2, a worker observes NL signs for assigned divided work. Section 3.4.1 
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shows that experience in Eq. (4) reflects the current amount of information a worker possesses 
about a task, and in addition, that the magnitude of improvement will diminish as N accumulates 
because the information on the task will approach saturation. This nature of the experience 
curve is very similar to that of the quantity of information, as shown in Sections 3.2 and 3.3. 
This similarity implies that N in Eq. (4) can be replaced with NL. 
 Let all signs in an economy be N
~
. NL is thereby part of N
~
. For simplicity, suppose 
that all workers are identical and the number of signs each worker observes is also identical. 
Thereby, the experience of a worker (NL) is inversely proportionate to the number of workers. 
Hence, 
 
 
LL βLN
1  , 
 
where βL is a constant.  LL βLN   indicates the total signs in the economy; thus, NβL
~
 . 
Here, N
~
 can be normalized such that N
~
= 1 by adjusting the scale of L. Because N
~
= 1, then 
 
1 LNL  .                               (5) 
 
Let 
LNL
C , be the magnitude of inefficiency in a worker’s divided work caused by fragmented 
information when each worker’s experience is NL. 
LNL
C ,  does not indicate the inefficiency 
initially generated by fragmented information but the inefficiency that remains even after 
mitigation by a worker who has dealt with unexpected problems. Costs will increase 
proportionally with increases in inefficiency; thus, 
LNL
C ,  also indicates costs. 
1
,

LNL
C  can be 
interpreted as the amount of productivity in a worker’s divided work, which increases as the 
amount of mitigation by the worker increases. 
 In Eq. (4), N is interpreted as the experience of a worker engaging in divided work. In 
Eq. (5), NL is also interpreted as the worker’s experience for a specific divided work. Therefore, 
N in Eq. (4) can be replaced with NL. Hence, 
 
)1(
1,,
α
LLNL NCC L
 ,                            (6) 
 
where 
1,LC  is the inefficiency when NL = 1 (i.e., NL = N
~
and L = 1). Section 3.3 shows that the 
quantity of information can be approximated by 
 
  βLL μNτ,NΠ   .                            (7) 
 
Therefore, combining Eq. (6) and (7), 
 
 
 
β
α
L
L,NL,
μ
τ,NΠ
CC
L








1
1
.                         (8) 
 
If βα 1 , then 
 
 τ,NΠ
C
C
L
L,
NL, L
1
  .                            (9) 
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Eqs. (8) and (9) indicate that inefficiency 
LNL
C , decreases as the quantity of information 
increases and imply that the quantity of information is the driving force behind the experience 
curve effect. The probable mechanism of the experience curve effect is that, as they amass 
larger quantities of information, workers can solve more unexpected problems by using their 
intelligence and the level of inefficiency thereby decreases. As discussed in Section 2, an 
important element that experience conveys is information. An increase in the quantity of 
information (i.e., an increase in experience) enables a worker to better understand the entire 
work scheme, create more innovations, and reduce the quantity of inefficiency caused by the 
division of work. 
 
3.4.3  The average quantity of information over the various types of 
work 
The value of τ will vary depending on the type of work being done. Eq. (7) therefore indicates 
that the value of α will also be different across various types of work if α and β are correlated 
such that βα 1 . As shown in Section 3.4.1, the estimates of α in the experience curves of 
various industries are usually between 0.6 and 0.9. This distribution reflects different values of τ 
in various industries. Nevertheless, the average α of an economy has usually been observed to 
be about 0.7 across both economies and time periods. Hence, the average quantity of 
information across the various types of work should also be similar across economies and time 
period. 
 
4  THE QUANTITY OF INFORMATION AND 
DIMINISHING MARGINAL PRODUCT OF LABOR 
 
4.1  Diminishing marginal product of labor 
4.1.1  Mitigation by intelligence and the quantity of information 
Because 11
1
1   αL,NL, LCC L , the productivity 
1
,

LNL
C is proportional to 
1αL not 1L . That is, even 
if L increases (i.e., signs per L decrease), the decrease in productivity is partially mitigated by 
the term αL  because of workers’ intelligence and innovations. From Eq. (9) and 
11
1
1   αL,NL, LCC L , 
 
 τ,NμΠL L
α 1  .                           (10) 
 
Eqs. (8), (9), and (10) indicate that 1
,

LNL
C is proportional to 
1αL because the quantity of 
information  τ,NΠ L  decreases at a slower rate than L increases. 
 
4.1.2  Effective labor input 
Let WL be the total amount of workers’ provision of labor input that is supplemented by 
workers’ innovations to mitigate the inefficiency resulting from fragmented and incomplete 
information. Hence, 
LWL
1  is the amount of a worker’s provision of labor input. Because the 
amount of a worker’s provision of labor input increases as productivity ( 1
,

LNL
C ) increases, then 
LWL
1  is directly proportional to 1
,

LNL
C such that 
 
 11 
LNL
LL
C
γ
L
W
,
  ,                             (11) 
 
where γL is a constant (i.e., γL indicates the output per worker in a period when 1, LNLC ). 
Substituting Eqs. (5) and (6) into Eq. (11) gives 
 
 
α
L
L
α
L
L
α
LL
L
NL
L
L L
C
γ
L
LC
γ
L
NC
γ
L
C
γ
W
L 1,
1
1,
1
1,,


 .             (12) 
 
Eq. (12) indicates that, instead of L, the labor input effectively provided by workers ( αL ) is 
directly proportional to 
LW ; thus, the effective labor input L
~
 is 
 
α
LLL LωWυL 
~
 ,                           (13) 
 
where υL and ωL are positive constant parameters and 
1L,
LL
L
C
γυ
ω  . Even in production functions 
at a macro level, the effective labor input should approximately have the functional form shown 
in Eq. (13), and the equation clearly indicates that the marginal product of labor is diminishing, 
even at the macro level. 
 
4.2  The quantity of information and the rational expectation 
hypothesis 
Suppose that the initial inefficiency (i.e., the level of inefficiency prior to mitigation by 
workers’ innovations) when NL = 1 is 1L,ρC where ρ > 1. This initial level of inefficiency is 
reduced to 
1L,C by ρ
–1
 as a result of the use of workers’ intelligence to innovate. Eq. (6) 
indicates that, as NL decreases (i.e., as L increases), the reduction of the initial level of 
inefficiency decreases; that is, 
1L,ρC  is reduced to 
)1(
1,,
α
LLNL NCC L
  by  αLNρ
 11 . For 
simplicity, suppose that βα 1 ; thus, by Eq. (7),  
 τ,NρΠ
Nρ
L
α
L

 11 . When experience is 
NL, the initial level of inefficiency is reduced by 
 τ,NρΠ L

 as a result of the use of workers’ 
intelligence. As the quantity of information increases, the initial level of inefficiency decreases 
at a higher rate. In other words, as the quantity of information increases, workers can more 
accurately find the true solutions to unexpected problems. This relationship indicates that the 
degree of inaccuracy of solutions to unexpected problems is inversely proportional to  τ,NΠ L . 
 The inaccuracy of a solution to an unexpected problem can be measured by the 
variance (σ2) of differences between actually observed values and predictions based on the 
solution. That is, the solution that a worker eventually chooses for an unexpected problem will 
not always be the best, but rather it diverges from the best solution with a variance of σ2. As 
shown above, the variance (i.e., the degree of inaccuracy) will be inversely proportional to 
 τ,NΠ L , most simply such that 
 
 
21 ψσ
τ,NΠ L
 ,                            (14) 
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where ψ is a positive constant. 
 Eq. (14) is consistent with the hypothesis of rational expectations, which states that 
agents’ predictions of the future value of economically relevant variables are not systematically 
wrong, or more simply, the mean prediction of agents is usually correct. The inefficiency caused 
by the division of work is related not to the mean but to the variance of differences between 
actually observed values and predictions. If the agents are rational, the mean prediction will not 
be systematically wrong (i.e., the expectation is rational), but the variance of predictions will 
take on different values depending on the quantity of information workers possess. 
 
4.3  The quantity of information and the central limit theorem 
Suppose that when   1τ,NΠ L , the expected degree of inaccuracy of each solution is 
2
1σ ; that 
is, 2
11 ψσ  by Eq. (14). Therefore, 
 
 
2
2
1 ψσ
,τNΠ
ψσ
L
 , 
 
by Eq. (14); thus, 
 
 ,τNΠ
σ
σ
L
2
12   .                            (15) 
 
The relation described by Eq. (15) is very similar to the central limit theorem. The central limit 
theorem indicates that the distribution of a random sample of size n with mean µ and variance 
2~σ  is close to the normal distribution with mean µ and variance 
n
σ 2~
. The quantity of 
information  τ,NΠ L  can be interpreted as the size of a random sample. In this random sample, 
 τ,NΠ L  units of information (i.e.,  τ,NΠ L samples) imparts an inaccuracy of  ,τNΠ
σ
σ
L
2
12  . 
As the quantity of information  τ,NΠ L  increases, the level of inaccuracy is reduced at the 
same rate. With increasing quantities of information, the probability that a worker chooses a 
solution close to the best solution increases because of the same mechanism shown in the 
central limit theorem. 
 
5  THE QUANTITY OF INFORMATION AND 
DIMINISHING MARGINAL PRODUCT OF 
CAPITAL 
 
As with labor input, capital inputs also have the property of a diminishing marginal product. 
This property can also be explained by the quantity of information in a similar manner as that 
discussed for labor. 
 
5.1  The quantity of information 
A worker encounters a unique combination of varieties of technology per unit capital (K
–1
A). 
Let NA be a worker’s average encounter frequency with each variety of technology per unit 
capital in a period. Many (usually minor) unexpected incidents occur in the production process 
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that are dealt with by ordinary workers. Suppose that an incident requires resolving a problem 
with a set of different varieties of technology. Hence, the incidents can be categorized by type, 
each of which implicitly indicates a set of different varieties of technology. The types are 
different from each other, but incidents within the same type are qualitatively identical. 
 Suppose that there are m types of incidents in a production process (i1, i2, i3,…, im). 
The probability of the occurrence of a given type per a variety in a period in the production 
process (i.e., the probability that a type occurs when a worker is encountering a variety) is 
assumed to be constant on average, and the occurrence probability of type iq is pq. The 
probability that type iq occurs at least once when a worker’s average encounter frequency is NA 
is 
 
     
  
 
  A
A
A N
qq
q
N
qN
qqqqqqq pp
p
p
ppppppp 




11
11
11
111
12
. 
 
This probability can be interpreted as the probability of the experience of dealing with type iq 
with an NA encounter frequency. Hence, the quantity of information of the production process 
with an NA encounter frequency is  
 
    
 












m
i i
N
iA
p
pNΠ A
1
1
ln11 . 
 
 ANΠ indicates the quantity of information that a worker can possess by encountering 
(experiencing) a variety NA times. (NA therefore indicates a worker’s experience on a variety per 
capital.) As was the case with  ANΠ , suppose that 1 > pi ≥ pi + 1 > 0 for any i, particularly 
τ
i ip
  where τ > 1. Hence,  ANΠ  can be redefined as  τ,NΠ A  such that 
 
          

















m
i
τNτ
m
i i
N
iA ii
p
pτ,NΠ
AA
11
ln11
1
ln11 . 
 
Because 1 > pi > 0 for any i,  τ,NΠ A  is a finite number. 
 The features of 
 
0
A
A
dN
τ,NdΠ
 and 
 
0
2
2

A
A
dN
τ,NΠd
 indicate that for many values of 
τ,  τ,NΠ A  can be approximated by exponential functions such that 
 
  γAA νNτ,NΠ                               (16) 
 
for 1≤ NL < N  where ν, γ, and N  are positive constants and 0 < γ < 1. In particular, if N  
is not large,  τ,NΠ A  will be approximated very well by Eq. (16). 
 
5.2  Diminishing marginal product of capital 
A worker encounters a unique combination of varieties of technologies (K
–1
A) per unit capital. 
As K
–1
A increases, the number of varieties per unit capital increases; thus, NA will decrease 
because the probability of encountering each of the varieties in K
–1
A in a period decreases. The 
amount of K
–1
A therefore will be inversely proportional to a worker’s experience on a variety 
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per capital (NA) such that 
 
1







K
A
βN AA , 
 
where βA is a positive constant. Normalizing the worker’s average encounter frequency βA to 
equal 1, then 
 
1







K
A
N A .                             (17) 
 
 Let 
ANA
C ,  be the amount of inefficiency resulting from imperfect technology 
embodied in capital when a worker utilizes a variety of technologies in K
–1
A in a period. 
ANA
C ,  
does not indicate the level of inefficiency initially generated by imperfect technology but that 
remaining after mitigation by workers’ innovations. Costs increase proportionally to increases in 
inefficiency; thus, 
ANA
C ,  also indicates costs. Conversely, 
1
,

ANA
C  can be interpreted as a 
productivity in supplementing imperfect technology by creating innovations when a worker 
utilizes a variety of technologies in K
–1
A in a period and each worker’s experience is NA. The 
creation of innovations will increase as the frequency of a worker’s encounters with a variety of 
technologies in K
–1
A increases (i.e., the productivity in supplementing imperfect technology by 
creating innovations will increase as the number of experiences increases). Hence, the 
inefficiency 
ANA
C , will decrease as the encounter frequency increases. The experience curve 
effect indicates that inefficiency 
ANA
C , declines (i.e., productivity 
1
,

ANA
C increases) as a 
worker’s experience on a variety per capital (NA) increases (i.e., K
-1
A becomes smaller) such that 
 
)1(
1,,
α
AANA NCC A
  ,                          (18) 
 
where 
1,AC  is the level of inefficiency when 1AN . Note that α is the constant parameter 
( 10  α ) used in Eq. (4).  
 Section 5.1 shows that the quantity of information  τ,NΠ A  can be approximated by 
Eq. (16). Therefore, combining Eq. (16) and (18), 
 
 
 
γ
α
A
A,NA,
v
τ,NΠ
CC
A








1
1
.                       (19) 
 
If γα 1 , then 
 
 τ,NΠ
vC
C
A
A,
NA, A
1
  .                           (20) 
 
Eqs. (19) and (20) indicate that inefficiency 
ANA
C , decreases as the quantity of information 
increases and imply that the quantity of information is the driving force behind the experience 
curve effect.  
 The amount of technology input per unit capital will increase as 1
,

ANA
C  increases 
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because the inefficiency is mitigated by an increased amount of workers’ innovations. Thus, the 
amount of technology input per unit capital when a worker uses a variety of technologies in 
K
–1
A will be inversely proportional to 
ANA
C , such that 
 
ANA
A
A
C
γ
K
A
W
,
1







 ,                          (21) 
 
where WA is the amount of technology input per unit capital when a worker utilizes a unique 
combination of varieties of technologies in K
–1
A, and γA is a positive constant (i.e., γA indicates 
the amount of technology input per unit capital when a worker utilizes a unique combination of 
varieties of technologies K
–1
A in a period when 1, ANAC ). Substituting Eqs. (17) and (18) into 
Eq. (21) gives 
 
 
α
A
A
α
A
A
α
AA
A
NA
A
A
K
A
C
γ
K
A
K
A
C
γ
K
A
NC
γ
K
A
C
γ
W
A
































1,
1
1,
1
1,,
 .      (22) 
 
 The amount of technology embodied in a unit of capital is K
–1
A. Because technology is 
imperfect, however, that level of technology input cannot be effectively realized. At the same 
time, the inefficiency resulting from these imperfections is mitigated by innovations created by 
ordinary workers even though it is not completely eliminated. Eq. (22) indicates that the 
magnitude of mitigation depends on K
–1
A, and that, with the mitigation, technology input per 
unit capital is effectively not equal to K
–1
A but directly proportionate to 
α
A
A
A
K
A
C
γ
W 






1,
. By 
Eq. (22), therefore, the effective technology input per unit capital ( A
~
) is 
 
α
AAA
K
A
ωWυA 






~
 ,                         (23) 
 
where υA and ωA are positive constant parameters and 
1A,
AA
A
C
γυ
ω  . Eq. (23) clearly shows that 
marginal product of capital is diminishing. 
 
6  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The reason for the diminishing marginal product of labor is usually explained by redundancy 
and congestion in labor inputs. However, there is a factor that may eliminate redundancy and 
congestion in labor inputs at the macro level: division of work. If division of work is well 
arranged, redundancy and congestion at the macro level will be almost removed. 
 If division of work almost eliminates redundancy and congestion, why has the 
marginal product of labor been empirically observed to be diminishing? The observed 
diminishing marginal product implies that there is another inefficiency that division of work 
does not remove. In this paper, I show that fragmentation of information among workers 
resulting from the division of work is the source of the diminishing marginal product of labor. 
The mechanism of fragmentation of information shown in Harashima (2009, 2011, 2012) is 
more deeply examined in the context of the concept of entropy in information theory (e.g., 
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Shannon, 1948; Theil, 1967, 1972) and the theory of the experience curve effect (e.g., Wright, 
1936; Hirsch, 1952; BCG, 1972). The model shows that the marginal product of labor is closely 
related to the quantity of information that a worker possesses, and the quantity of information is 
the key factor in the diminishing marginal product of labor. 
 Aspects of the concepts presented in this paper could be beneficial in the field of 
business management. Although I have assumed that the effects of division of work are 
identical across firms, they actually will be different among firms. The inefficiency caused by 
division of work inside a firm will be reduced by improving information sharing among workers 
in the firm. If a firm succeeds in improving information sharing, it will have an advantage over 
other competitive firms.  
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